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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ERNEST JOE VELASQUEZ 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 17242 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with one count of second-
degree murder in violation of § 76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, for the murder of Richard Whitehead. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of second-degree murder on June 9, 1980, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Christine M. Durham, presiding. 
Appellant waived the minimum time for sentencing 
and was sentenced on June 9, 1980 by Judge Durham to serve an 
indeterminate term of from five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered in the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The decedent, Richard Whitehead, age 30 (T. 55), 
was found dead in his apartment located at 242-1/2 South 200 
East, #3, Salt Lake City, on November 22, 1979 by his brother, 
Paul Whitehead. Paul Whitehead had been attempting to contact 
his brother for three days (T. 56-60). His first attempt was 
around 11:30 a.m. on the morning of November 19 after he had 
been notified by the victim's employer that he had failed to 
show up for work (T. 56). He received no answer at his 
brother's apartment and returned to try again later in the 
afternoon (T. 57). At that time, he saw Ernest Joe Velasquez, 
the appellant, outside the apartment complex. The appellant 
asked Mr. Whitehead who he was looking for, and when Paul 
Whitehead told him he was looking for his brother, Richard, 
the appellant told him that the victim had gone to Las Vegas 
with Steve Southwood, who also resided in the apartment 
complex (T. 58). 
On the 20th of November, Paul Whitehead attempted 
three more times to locate his brother. on the 22nd at about 
9:00 a.m. he saw Mr. Southwood, who told him that the victim 
-2-
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had not gone to Las Vegas with him (T. 59). Mr. Whitehead 
then contacted all the local hospitals in an attempt to locate 
his brother. Receiving no further information, he returned to 
the apartment and, with the aid of Mr. Southwood, gained entry 
into his brother's apartment through the bedroom window (T. 
60). He saw his brother lying on the bed and covered in rrlood 
(T. 62). He entered the room, told Mr. Southwood to remain 
outside, and then went to the body of his brother to check for 
a pulse (T. 63). Finding none, he left the apartment and went 
to a phone to call the police (T. 64). 
During the course of the investigation, Officer 
Voyles of the Salt Lake City Police Department discovered a 
set of blood-smudged prints located on the wall above the bed 
of the deceased. At trial those prints were identified as 
belonging to the appellant by Bill Simpson, an expert assigned 
to the identification bureau of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (T. 351). He testified that by using a comparison 
technique he had found at least 11 points which matched (T. 
360, 361, 370) the prints of the appellant. 
In the apartment adjacent to where the victim was 
found were two individuals under the supervision of the Utah 
Division of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole Office. 
These individuals were Jessie Garcia and Ernest Velasquez (T. 
127, 133). on November 27, Officer Harris, the appellant's 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parole officer (T. 114), went to the apartment of the 
appellant to finalize observations before verifying the 
appellant's transfer of supervision from New Mexico to Utah 
(T. 121). He was accompanied by Sergeant Hanks of the 
Sheriff's Office, who had been with him on ariother matter (T. 
120). The sergeant informed Harris of the recent discovery of 
a body at the same location (T. 124). While at the apartment, 
Harris also discovered for the first time that Jessie Garcia, 
who he knew was on parole in Utah, was living with the 
appellant (T. 121). He also noted the presence of two 
females who appeared to be juveniles (T. 122). 
While with the appellant, Officer Harris discussed 
appellant's need to obtain employment. Appellant told Officer 
Harris that it was difficult to obtain a job at that point 
because he would have to be travelling to New Mexico to 
testify in a murder case (T. 123). Appellant also told 
Officer Harris of another murder which he had witnessed in 
prison (T. 124). This knowledge of appellant's prior 
involvement in murder cases was taken by Officer Harris to the 
Salt Lake Police Department and to Officer Harris' supervising 
officer in the Adult Probation and Parole Office, Dennis Holm 
(T. 127, 133). 
Appellant's transfer for supervision from New 
Mexico was completed on November 9, 1979 (T. 127, 133). 
-4-
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During the same time period, Officer Poulton, who 
was Jessie Garcia's parole officer, received information from 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office that Garcia had offered 
to secure cocaine and was dealing in drugs (T. 143). He then 
learned that the appellant was on parole and that, in 
contravention of departmental policy, these parolees were-
living together (T. 143). He took this information to Dennis 
Holm (T. 28, 144), who was his supervisor. 
Dennis Holm compiled all the information received 
from the individual parole officers and decided that a search 
of the parolees' apartment ought to take place because: 1) 
they were thought to be engaging in the sale of drugs, 2) they 
were violating departmental policy by living together, 3) they 
had no visible means of legal support, and 4) minor women had 
been seen on the premises. On November 29, six officers from 
the Adult Probation and Parole Department went to the 
parolees' apartment (T. 24, 144, 175, 184). On arrival, the 
appellant led them into the front room. Officers Poulton, 
Holm and Kelly went to talk to Jessie Garcia (T. 129). 
Officer Harris, the appellant's parole officer, 
asked the appellant to go to his bedroom to get out of the 
commotion (T. 130). Officer Coombs accompanied them and 
entered the room first. While in the room, he saw in plain 
view on the shelf of the closet a box of .22-caliber shells 
which he showed to Officer Harris (T. 26, 131, 181). Harris 
-5-
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L 
then placed handcuffs on the appellant. Dennis Holm then 
authorized a search of the entire premises (T. 25). The 
search produced a .22 automatic handgun (T. 111, 186) and a 
magazine (T. 187) which were seized along with the .22 shells 
and taken to Officer Voyles of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (T. 188, 203). 
At trial appellant made a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained by the Adult Probation and Parole Department 
since it was obtained in the course of a warrantless search 
(T. l, 106). The trial court denied this motion, finding that 
the search was reasonable and conducted in furtherance of the 
supervisory duties and obligations of the Division of Adult 
Probation and Parole (T. 169). 
The appellant and Miss Brenda valentine were 
charged with the murder of Richard Whitehead (T. 658). In a 
statement given on December 6, 1979 (T. 650) to the police, 
Miss Valentine claimed no involvement in the crime (T. 653). 
She stated that on either the 17th or 18th of November the 
appellant arose from bed, stated he wanted to fight with 
someone, and left the apartment. He returned a short time 
later, took something from the apartment, and left again. 
When he returned the second time, he was covered in blood and 
told Miss Valentine that he had just "dusted" someone (T. 
654). 
-6-
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At trial, both the appellant and Miss valentine 
changed their pre-trial stories and testified to a similar 
state of events which implicated Miss Valentine as the 
murderer (T. 429-447, 506-530). Allegedly the victim had been 
knocked unconscious by the appellant in a fist fight and Miss 
valentine had then shot the victim. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to second-
degree murder on June 9, 1980 (T. 717). Appellant then waived 
the minimum time for sentencing and was sentenced to serve the 
indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison (T. 721). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED IN A WARRANTLESS BUT OTHERWISE 
REASONABLE SEARCH BY PAROLE OFFICERS. 
Appellant, through counsel, made a timely motion to 
suppress all the evidence removed from the appellant's 
residence by parole officers. The trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the matter and determined that the 
warrantless search by the Division of Adult Probation and 
Parole was not unreasonable and did not constitute a per se 
violation of appellant's Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
-7-
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Appellant claims that searches by parole officers 
conducted without a warrant are the legal equivalent of 
searches of law-abiding citizens by police officers without a 
warrant. This characterization fails to recognize that 
persons on parole are not allowed the full extent of liberty 
accorded law-abiding citizens. The trial court recognized 
that the liberty interest and privacy interest of parolees are 
not the same as the ordinary citizen's, especially in the 
relationship between a parolee and his parole officer. For 
this reason, Article I-§12 of the Utah Constitution has a 
similar provision which this search did not violate. The 
trial court denied the motion relying on the reasoning of 
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975) (T. 170). 
The trial court applied a reasonableness test to 
the actions of the parole officers and found that the 
circumstances of this case supported a reasonable suspicion 
that either criminal activity was occurring or a parole 
violation had occurred, and therefore in furtherance of the 
duty to supervise parolees, the action of the Adult Probation 
and Parole Division did not constitute an unreasonable 
infringement on the appellant's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
-8-
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A. PAROLEES HAVE A LESSER EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY THAN ORDINARY LAW-ABIDING 
CITIZENS. 
Al though this Court has never addressed the 
application of Fourth Amendment rights to parolees before, it 
has examined the condition and limitations on individuals who 
are on parole. In Reeves v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 310, 501 P".2d 
1212 ( 1972) this Court stated that "a parole is in the nature 
of a grant of partial liability or a lessening of restrictions 
to a convicted prisoner• (Id. at 1214). The Court in that 
case adopted the theory that a parolee is still "in custodia 
legis" and subject to limitations of custody which do not 
apply to ordinary law-abiding citizens. 
The appellant argues that the theory of 
"constructive custody" was buried in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972) (Appellant's Brief at 23); however, that case 
did not totally disabuse the theory of legal custody except 
where that custody theory was used to deny a parolee basic 
elements of due process. Hhen an individual is on parole, he 
may still be subject to limitations stemming from the 
custodial nature of parole. Demonstrating that the theory of 
legal custody has not been fully rejected in this 
jurisdiction, this Court, in Ward v. Smith, Utah, 573 P.2d 
781, 782 (1978) affirmed the rationale of~· supra, and 
remal·ns in legal custody until such stated that "The parolee 
-9-
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time as his sentence is terminated." In that case, the Court 
also noted that "Parole is not absolute liberty as all law-
abiding citizens enjoy, but only conditional liberty dependent 
upon compliance with parole restrictions." 573 P.2d at 782. 
In a dicta statement of Reeves v. Turner, supra, 
this Court noted that "[t]he standards governing the arrest 
and search of citizens possessed of full civil rights are not 
applicable to the act of taking physical custody of a 
parolee." (Id. at 1214). This statement is consistent with 
the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, where in Latta v. 
Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (1975), the Court noted that the 
parole system of regulation and supervision naturally 
diminishes the expectation of privacy of parolees. 
B. NOT ALL WARANTLESS SEARCHES BY PAROLE 
OFFICERS OF PAROLEES' RESIDENCES VIOLATE 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD OF 
REASONABLENESS. 
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that parolees cannot be 
deprived of due process under a constrictive theory of 
constructive custody. The Court stated that minimum due 
process had to be afforded to parolees in a revocation 
hearing. The Court, however, did not state that appropriate 
limits tied to the parolee status can never be placed on the 
constitutional rights afforded parolees. The historical 
-10-
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analysis of the parole system (Id. at 477-480) provides a 
backdrop to the imposition of legitimate restrictions on the 
liberty interests afforded to parolees. The Court recognized 
that the purpose of parole conditions are twofold in that: 
•• : ~hey prohibit either absolutely or 
conditionally, behavior that is deemed 
dangerous to the restoration of the 
individual into normal society. And 
through the requirement of reporting to 
the parole officer and seeking guidance 
and permission before doing many things, 
the officer is provided with information 
about the parolee and an opportunity to 
advise him. 
Id. at 478. However, the extent to which a parole officer may 
control a parolee is limited by standards of due process. As 
the Court has noted, "once it is determined that due process 
applies, the question remains what process is due.• Id. at 
481. 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 
due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. Thus, in 
determining whether the search of a parolee's residence 
without a warrant by his parole officer is a per se violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, the analysis must focus on the 
particular circumstances presented by such a search and by 
balancing the interests of the parolee against the state 
interest in having reasonable searches to determine whether 
the parolee is meeting the conditions of his parole. 
-11-
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Although the United States Supreme Court and this 
Court have never ruled on the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment may be invaded to ensure that parolees are living up 
to the conditions of their parole, many state and federal 
courts have examined the issue. The leading case in the area 
was written by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en bane. The case produced an entire spectrum of 
opinions regarding the nature of the privacy right held by 
parolees. The majority opinion in Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 
F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975) held that a search by a parole 
officer, accompanied by police officers, of the appellant's 
home was reasonable when the officer believed that the search 
was necessary to the performance of his duty, as long as the 
search was based on a reasonable suspicion of either criminal 
activity or violation of parole. 
The court in Latta recognized that the broad power 
to search which was traditionally allowed in California was 
subject to constitutional standards. However, the issues 
presented by the Fourth Amendment center around the 
reasonableness of the search and the acceptance or rejection 
of the traditional standard of probable cause required. The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that the fact that the traditional 
standard of probable cause could not be met does not end the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. In California, as in Utah (see: 
-12-
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Reeves v. Turner, supra) a "parolee is in a different 
position from that of the ordinary citizen. He is still 
serving his sentence; he remains under the ultimate control of 
the Adult Authority and the immediate control of his parole 
officer." 521 F.2d at 249. It is because of this special 
relationship between a parolee and his parole officer, an~ the 
parole officer's duty to protect the parole system and the 
public, that reasonable warrantless searches by the parole 
officer are justified when the officer believes that the 
search is necessary in the performance of his duties (Id. at 
250). 
The cornerstone of the Ninth Circuit Court's 
reasoning is that not all searches without warrants by parole 
officers are a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. The 
relationship of the parole officer and the parolee require 
that: 
Id. at 251. 
the propriety of warrantless searches 
pursuant to proper conditions affixed.to 
the status of parole cannot be determined 
by automatic reference.to the law of 
ordinary search and seizure or to that of 
administrative searches. 
The majority opinion then limited warrantless 
searches by parole officers to those which are reasonable. 
Respondent submits that this analysis is the appropriate 
-13-
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standard against which a balancing of the interests of the 
individual and the rights of society may be accomplished. The 
majority of state and federal courts that have examined the 
issue have adopted either the majority or concurring opinion 
in Latta (See Appendix A, infra). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THIS CASE WAS 
REASONABLE. 
The trial court adopted the majority's standard as 
delineated in Latta v. Fitzharris, supra, and Point I-B above 
(See also Appendix B, infra). 
Prior to applying the Latta standard, the court 
made the following findings of fact: 
(T. 169). 
1) Appellant was in fact a parolee 
subject to the supervision of the Utah 
Division of Corrections at the time the 
search was conducted. 
2) The search was reasonable, and 
conducted in furtherance of supervisory 
duties and obligations of the Division of 
Adult Probation and Parole to discover 
whether: 
a) the appellant and Mr. Garcia were 
using or dealing in drugs, 
b) they were involved in criminal 
activities involving either drugs or juveniles. 
3) There was the presence of minors on 
the premises; 
4) There was information from an 
informant respecting drug dealing; and 
5) Appellant and Garcia each had a record 
of prior similar crimes and were living 
next door to where a murder took place. 
-14-
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These facts, when tested under Latta, justified the 
search of the premises by members of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
The cases cited by appellant do not detract from 
the position adopted by the district court. The Fourth 
Circuit Court is the only circuit where the dissenting opinion 
in Latta has been adopted. The other state cases cited by 
appellant are either distinguishable and/or recognize that the 
rights of a parolee may be limited by virtue of the parolee 
status. 
In State v. Gansz, 297 So.2d 614 (Fla. App. 1974) 
the court recognized that a probationer (not a parolee) is not 
deprived of the constitutional guarantee of a search warrant. 
However, the court also noted that status of the probationer 
is an important factor "in determining whether a search and 
seizure is reasonable or whether there is probable cause for 
the issuance of a search warrant" (Id. at 616). Implicit in 
this language is the acknowledgment that the extent of 
applying the constitutional rights afforded probationers is 
not unnecessarily the same as applied against ordinary 
citizens. 
In both State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980) 
and Roman v. state, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977), the courts 
relied on the state and not federal constitution to invalidate 
-15-
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broad boiler plate conditions to parole and probation which 
did not take into account the individual differences of each 
parole in probation situation. Alaska, however, specifically 
limited the rejection of the form consent before it to the 
facts of the case and also rejected the sweeping stand of the 
Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, cert. 
denied, 389 u.s. 938 (Iowa 1970), in footnote 29 stating: 
Cullison involved a search and 
seizure which was not conducted pursuant 
to a condition of a parole and the court 
did not there consider whether there were 
any valid limits on a parolee's or 
probationer's expectation of privacy. 
The Alaska court then narrowly limited extensions of the 
Fourth Amendment requirements by relying on its state 
constitution. 
In this case, the search was reasonable and 
therefore, the warrantless search by parole officers, who were 
simply doing their duty, did not violate appellant's right to 
privacy. At the very least there was not an invasion of the 
privacy interest to any greater than that which exists by 
virtue of the parole status. 
The appellant also claims that the obtaining of the 
information that appellant and Mr. Garcia were selling and/or 
using drugs was insufficient to justify the search because it 
came from the police department. A similar argument is made 
with regard to the conversations of Officer Voyles and Dennis 
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Holms. In United States ex rel. Santos v. New York, 441 F.2d 
1216 (2nd Cir. 1971) the court recognized that: 
The mere fact that the police 
officer was the first to suspect that 
appellant was engaged in criminal 
activity and related this fact to the 
parole officer and was present at the 
subsequent investigation in no way alters 
the legality of the parole officer's 
presence. It does not require the 
suppression of the seized evidence from 
use in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
Applying this standard and recognizing that in this case the 
Adult Probation and Parole Department already knew that at 
least one violation of parole standards was being violated 
(since two parolees were living together, contrary to 
departmental rules), the search and seizure of the evidence 
from the home of the appellant was reasonable and within the 
standards of the Fourth Amendment. 
POINT II 
CUMULATIVE ERROR WHICH rs NON-PREJUDICIAL 
DOES NOT JUSTIFY REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
The appellant claims that numerous errors (cited in 
Point II of his brief at 26-38), although determined by the 
trial court to be non-prejudicial when considered 
individually, are transformed into prejudicial error 
warranting reversal when they are accumulated. This Court 
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has recognized that great deference is given to the trial 
court and reversal of verdicts which are sound will not be 
made where an appellant raises mere technicalities or 
irregularities unless they placed the defendant at a 
substantial disadvantage. In State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 426, 
432 P.2d S3 (1967), this Court stated: 
[O]nce a fair trial has been afforded the 
defendant and a verdict which is 
supported by the evidence rendered, the 
proceedings are presumed to be valid; and 
we are not disposed to reverse for mere 
technicalities or irregularities unless 
they put the defendant at some 
substantial disadvantage or had some 
material bearing on the fairness of the 
proceedings or its outcome (footnote 
omitted). 
Id. at SS. See also: State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 
P.2d 639 (1970); State v. Codianna, Utah, S73 P.2d 343, 349 
(1977). 
Acceptance of appellant's claim would require this 
Court to state that quantity of non-prejudicial error without 
demonstration of actual prejudice to the appellant somehow 
transforms the harmless error into reversible error. As 
·demonstrated below, each error claimed by the appellant in the 
trial court was determined to have no actual prejudice to the 
appellant, nor influence on the outcome of the case. In this 
situation, the conviction of the appellant should be affirmed. 
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A. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES IS WITHIN THE 
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
'!be right to exclude witnesses and others from 
certain types of proceedings is provided for by statute and is 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. The rule is found 
in§ 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, which 
states: 
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE IN CERTAIN CASES, --In 
an action of divorce, criminal 
conversation, seduction, abortion, rape, 
or assault with intent to commit rape, 
the court may, in its discretion, exclude 
all persons who are not directly 
interested therein, except jurors, 
witnesses and officers of the court; and 
in any cause the court may, in its 
discretion, during the examination of a 
witness exclude any and all other 
witnesses in the cause. 
In this case, the trial court granted a motion to 
exclude non-testifying witnesses (T. 50) at the begining of 
trial. However, near the end of trial it was discovered on 
cross-examination that Officer Gillies had violated the 
exclusionary rule by discussing Officer voyle's testimony 
prior to testifying himself (T. 681). 
Appellant made a motion for a mistrial based on the 
violation of the exclusionary rule by the officers. This 
motion was denied when, outside the presence of the jury, the 
court determined that the testimony of Gillies had not been 
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affected by the discussion, the appellant was not prejudiced 
by the violation, and, in fact, the testimony of Gillies 
actually aided rather than harmed the appellant. The court 
ruled that no prejudice had occurred and denied the motion, 
stating: 
They should have known better; Miss 
Valentine should have known better. She 
was here in the courtroom when she was 
instructed. But I am unable to see any 
fashion in which Detective Gillies' 
testimony was influenced by his 
conversation. 
In fact, his recollection of what 
Detective Voyles told him about the 
testimony in the courtroom was not what 
Detective Voyles had in fact testified 
to, at least with respect to the 
intoxication. And to that extent it 
seems to me that the testimony you 
elicited was helpful to the defendant 
rather than prejudicial. 
(T. 68, 69). Thus, although the court recognized that the 
officers were in error when they violated the exclusionary 
rule, it was not prejudicial and therefore no basis upon which 
the appellant could obtain reversal of his conviction. State 
v. Dodge, Utah, 564 P.2d 312 (1977) and State v. Carlson, 
Utah, 635 P.2d 72 (1981). Even in State v. Barboa, 506 P.2d 
1222 (N.M. 1973), cited by the appellant, there is a 
requirement that some type of harm be shown to the appealing 
party before there is a basis upon which to reverse his 
conviction. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE READING OF A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE BY TWO 
JURORS WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
The trial court admonished the jury to ignore press 
reports when the court recessed for the weekend (T. 586). In 
polling the jury on Monday, the court discovered that two of 
the jurors had read a newspaper article in the Salt Lake -
Tribune which summarized the evidence presented at trial on 
Thursday, June 5, 1979 (T. 596, 601). Both jurors who 
indicated exposure to the article, Mrs. Zabriskie and Mrs. 
Bancroft, stated that the article did not present anything 
which they had not already known from the presentation of 
evidence. 
The appellant moved for a mistrial and the trial 
court denied the motion stating: 
Well, I don't think a juror's 
failure to follow the instructions of the 
court is, per se, grounds for a mistrial. 
I think you would have to demonstrate 
some prejudice thereby. And if this were 
a case involving multiple news reports 
and accounts which the court could not 
monitor I think that I probably would 
have to: if anyone admitted to listening 
to them and reading them. But whe~e we 
are dealing with one newspaper article, 
which I do have before me, I do~'t.have 
it here today, but I have seen it in my 
own newspaper, and I expect that the ~n7 
thing we need to do is make i~ an exhibit 
to the trial, although not a Jury 
exhibit, in order for your to preserve 
the case. 
( T. 611) , and 
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After I had read it I felt that even 
if a juror should inadvertently or 
improperly review that article that he or 
she could not be improperly influenced by 
it, because it was nothing more than a 
recapitulation of what they had heard the 
day prior in trial. And although I am 
very concerned that two jurors did that, 
and I intend to let the jurors know that 
it is a serious problem before the trial 
is out, it does not seem to me that in 
this instance it can or has influenced 
the outcome of the trial. And I will 
deny the motion for a mistrial on that 
basis. 
This is not a case where the news reports were so 
numerous that they could not be monitored by the court. The 
court was able to determine that the only article which two of 
the eight jurors had read did not contain anything which was 
likely to prejudice a juror but was, rather, a simple 
reiteration of facts which did not cause actual prejudice. 
In State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P.2d 857 (1978) this 
Court recognized that the granting of a motion for a new trial 
based on exposure to media is a question which is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Furthermore, this Court 
stated the motion should be granted only where actual 
prejudice or the inflammatory nature of the publicity creates 
inherent prejudice against the appellant. 
In this case, the newspaper article had been read 
by the judge who determined that it was not so influential as 
to in any way affect the jurors' ability to be impartial. 
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This determination is justified by the record and does not 
merit reversal of appellant's conviction. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY 
RESTRICT APPELLANT'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF 
AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
Bill Simpson was qualified by the state at trial as 
an identification expert (T. 351). He testified that prints 
in blood, found inside the victim's apartment, had eleven 
points of comparison with prints belonging to the appellant, 
and it was therefore his opinion that the prints did in fact 
belong to the appellant (T. 361). 
On cross-examination, appellant attempted to 
discredit the procedure used by the witness to compare the 
fingerprints found with those of the appellant (T. 369). 
Appellant's counsel was able to show that the expert had 
failed to use a method of identification which required 
measurement of the distance between certain ridges (T. 369). 
'lbe appellant then attempted to impeach the reliability of the 
test used by posing hypotheses based in hypothetical results 
of the test which the expert admitted he did not use. The 
state objected to this line of questioning, claiming that it 
called for an opinion of the witness which could not be based 
on the facts in evidence (T. 370). The trial court sustained 
the objection, agreeing that the appellant could not pose 
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hypothetical questions which did not have a basis in the facts 
in evidence (T. 371). The court stated that appellant was 
entitled to hypothetical questions "unless you can establish 
that there are those variances in this case" (T. 371). 
This Court has consistently held that the extent of 
cross-examination is a matter of discretion for the trial 
court. In State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015 (1978), this 
Court stated that: 
The matter of cross examination and the 
extent thereof rests largely in the 
discretion of the trial judge, and he 
will be reversed only if he abuses his 
discretion in a given case. Even if an 
error is made in limiting cross 
examination, it is not to be reversed 
unless it also is prejudicial (footnote 
omitted). 
See also: State v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386 (1977) and 
State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 384, 501 P.2d 636 (1972). 
Thus, in order to find reversible error in the 
restriction of cross-examining a witness, there must be clear 
abuse of discretion by the trial court and a finding that 
prejudice to the appellant resulted. Neither finding is 
justified in the present case. Here the district court 
limited the examination only when the appellant attempted to 
question the expert about facts which were not only not in the 
record, but which could not be placed in the record because 
the test from which the questions were derived was not used 
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in the present case. Because the court did not prohibit the 
defense counsel from shadowing the overall testing used by the 
expert in the absence of the measurement test, there is no 
showing that the failure to allow further questioning in any 
way prejudiced the appellant. 
Rule 58 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, relied 6n by 
the appellant, does not apply to the facts of this case. That 
rule provides: 
HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERT OPINION NOT 
NECESSARY. Questions calling for the 
opinion of an expert witness need not be 
hypothetical in form unless the judge in 
his discretion so requires, but the 
witness may state his opinion and reasons 
therefor without first specifying data on 
which it is based as an hypothesis or 
otherwise; but upon cross-examination he 
may be required to specify such data. 
'Ille rule recognizes the discretion of the trial court and is 
designed to allow exposure of the weaknesses of that which 
experts testify to, not that which is merely speculated upon 
and not based on the facts of the case. 
Therefore, the limitation imposed upon the 
appellant was a correct exercise of the discretion of the 
trial court and does not justify reversal, especially where 
the jury was made aware of the fact that other mechanisms of 
testing were available and not used. 
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Furthermore, even the cases relied upon by the 
appellant, while not requiring all the facts to be in 
evidence, do require the hypothesis to be based upon a fair 
combination of facts supported by the evidence. See: Samuel 
v. Vanderheiden, 560 P.2d 636, 638 (Ore. 1977). Since the 
facts which the appellant attempted to question upon were not 
supported by the evidence, the trial court correctly exercised 
its discretion in sustaining the state's objection and the 
appellant was not harmed thereby. 
D, ERROR IN FAILING TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF 
IMPROPER HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL AND DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
REVERSAL. 
After Brenda Valentine testified that she had lied 
to police officers in denying complicity with the crime when 
she had initially been arrested for the murder of Richard 
Whitehead (T. 529), the state called both police officers to 
the stand and elicited testimony regarding the prior 
inconsistent statement she had made on December 6, 1979. The 
defense counsel failed to object at the time the officers were 
questioned, but after the fact made a motion to strike the 
testimony claiming it was hearsay (T. 710). 'llle trial court 
did not deal with whether the appellant had waived his right 
to contest the testimony but ruled that on the merits of the 
issue the testimony of the officers was hearsay but it 
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fell within Rule 63(1) (a) and (b) of the hearsay exceptions. 
The court stated: 
THE COURT: Rule 63(1) says that a prior 
statement of the witness is admissible, 
even though hearsay, if the judge finds 
that the witness had an adequate 
opportunity to perceive the event, 
provided that, (a) it is inconsistent 
with his present testimoni, (b) it 
contains otherwise admissible·facts which 
the witness denies having stated or has 
forgotten since making the statement. 
And that would apply, or it will support 
testimony made by the witness in the 
present case when such testimony has been 
challenged. 
Well, that would be if someone else 
offers it. 
So you rely on subparagraphs (b) and 
(a); inconsistency and contains otherwise 
admissible facts. 
(T. 711) and: 
THE COURT: But that still doesn't 
render the prior statement consistent 
with all of her testimony, now. The jury 
is entitled to consider the 
inconsistency. 
I would rely, in denying the motion 
to strike, on subparagraph (b), that the 
testimony of the officers ~bout her . 
statements contains otherwise admissible 
facts and that the witness denied having 
stated or has forgotten it. 
She denied, if I can recall. If I 
can recall correctly there were at least 
three statements on which she was cross-
examined that she denied. 
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(T. 712). 
MR. HOUSLEY: And there were a 
couple she said she forgot she made, at 
least she can't remember whether she made 
them. 
THE COURT: So on the basis of Rule 
63(1), subparagraph (b), I will deny the 
motion to strike. 
The court did recognize that it was possible to 
subject a portion of the testimony to a motion to strike but 
determined that: 
it would be impossible for me to instruct 
the jury on that question. I would have 
to explain all of Rule 63(1), 
subparagraph (b) to them, and I think 
that is not feasible. 
This Court should not disturb that determination where, as 
here, the trial court is in the better position to observe and 
understand the limitation on the jury's ability to perceive 
and comprehend what portions the judge was attempting to 
strike. The further consideration of the trial court was that 
the trial court needed to take the route least likely to 
enhance any error to the detriment of the appellant. 
Therefore, the actions of the trial court were proper and did 
not result in prejudice to the appellant requiring reversal by 
this Court. This is supported by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence which states that this Court, in examining errors of 
admission of evidence, should not reverse an otherwise sound 
-28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conviction unless the error had a "substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict or finding." 
E. INTRODUCTION OF PICTURES TO REBUT POINTS 
OF APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPER. 
The appellant raised a motion in limine to pictures 
which the state proposed to introduce to rebut specific 
portions of the appellant's testimony at trial (T. 499). The 
court denied this motion in limine, determining that: 
Although they are not pleasant to 
look at, it is not this court's opinion 
that they are so shocking and unpleasant 
to se that they would constitute 
prejudice merely because of that aspect, 
and it is also my opinion that they 
definitely have probative value, that 
they may very well tend to show and that 
the prosecution could argue from them in 
closing argument that there are 
inconsistencies betwen the location and 
condition of the body and the defendant's 
testimony on the stand. 
(T. 500). The court recognized that parties had entered into 
a stipulation that was perfectly sufficient at the time 
questions raised by the appellant's testimony made the 
exhibits proper mechanisms for rebuttal (T. 501). 
The state also placed in the record the fact that 
the original stipulation was made more for defense than state 
purposes (T. 501). 
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Since the trial court determined that the probative 
value, in light of the doubt cast by the testimony of the 
appellant, outweighed the unpleasant (but not prejudicial) 
nature of the photographs, there was no error in their 
admission. 
As noted by appellant in First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. c. N. Zundel, Utah, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (1979), 
this Court noted that parties may be relieved of their 
stipulations by the court. This was properly done in this 
case and the court did not clearly abuse its discretion in 
releasing the state from the stipulation. 
Respondent has established that each of the alleged 
errors were either not error at all or if they were error were 
harmless. Where this is the case, accumulation of harmless 
errors cannot establish prejudice to a defendant unless the 
errors are so numerous and significant that the defendant's 
right to a fair trial has been denied. The harmless errors in 
this case are trivial both individual! and when examined 
together. Thus, they do not warrant reversal of appellant's 
conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed 
because the trial court correctly applied, in light of a 
lesser expectation of privacy, an exception to the search 
warrant requirement where a parole officer and a parolee are 
involved. Secondly, the errors claimed by the appellant on 
appeal were either non-existent or non-prejudicial and do not 
justify a reversal of the conviction. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~!~"U 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Lynn R. 
Brown, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
South 200 Eas t, salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, Association, 333 
this 26th day of January, 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
the case of Mr. Velasquez or Mr. Garcia, but if that were 
the case, that he had had a prior history of doing 
that the parole officer would be able to focus 
and make it a condition of somebody's 
that they could conduct searches of this 
knowledgeable of it, put it 
make them 
agreement, and 
have them sign it, which is quit frequently done, but not 
done in this particular case 
are situations where people 
on parole or probat' n in special circumstances, that 
condition coul e brought about where they could search 
arch warrant. I think it would have to be without a 
spell out in their parole agreement or probation agreement 
14 order to do that. 
15 I don't think the court would be warranted in 
16 this case in adopting Mr. Housley' s argument that the mere 
17 fact that they are on parole in any way diminishes their 
18 right to be secured in their own home from unreasonable 
19 search and seizure, and that the minimum requirement of the 
20 fourth amendment requires that they have a search warrant. 
21 THE COURT: Well, that means of formulating the issue, 
22 though, sort of begs the question. Because it is -not a ques-
21 
, . 
• o 
26 
27 
~8 
29 
30 
tion of their having a right to be secure from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. - The question before us here is 
whether the search and seizure is reasonable, and one of 
h d · · one of the standards, used in that t e eterrn1nat1ons, or 
determination has to do with the expectation of privacy. 
And that gets us to the question of whether parclees have 
a different kind of expectation of privacy than ordinary 
citizens. 
f 11 l 
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MR. BROWN: well, with that balancing theory r don't 
2 think you can lump all the parolees into one group and treat 
3 them all the same. 
THE COURT: Well, I think that is what Latta does 
5 in fact. 
6 MR. BROWN: That is what Latta does. And that is 
7 what I am suggesting that I think the trend of the law is 
8 getting away from. Latta is only a Federal Circuit Court 
= 9 decision. 
10 The other cases cited, that I have cited to 
11 the court that have held contrary to that, are certain 
12 court decisions. 
13 THE COURT: I don't have any of those opinions before 
14 me, unfortunately. 
15 Let me ask you this, too, Mr. Brown, which 
16 poses considerable problems for me, and I will grant you, 
Ii at least based on the analysis provided by LaFave, accord-
18 ing to LaFave's analysis, the weight of the jurisdictions 
19 or the weight of the precedent is in favor of warrantless 
20 searches of parolees as being constitutionally permissible. 
21 He does suggest and strongly advocates in his 
22 analysis that the trend both ought to continue to be a 
2.3 waiver of that kind of analysis and towards an application 
24 of stricter standards or similar standards for parolees 
25 and other citizens. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
MR. BROWN: Yes. I believe he does indicate the 
weight of the authority is that. 
Now, if the court wants to count up the cases 
and see where the weight of the authority is, I am sure 
that the weight of the authority is considerably in support , Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
I• 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
court to --
THE COURT: No. I agree. But that was a preface to 
the question I wanted to ask you. 
As far as you know, on the basis of the authori-
ties you have submitted to me, this question has not been 
dealt with at all by the Utah Supreme Court. 
MR. BROWN: Or the United States Su~reme Court. 
THE COURT: Or the United States Supreme Court. And 
you are literally requesting me to make some prediction, 
you are asking me to make an impossible prediction, because 
you are asking both for an indication of which way our 
Supreme Court will go on this issue and, as I understand it, 
if this motion to suppress is granted, the matter cannot be 
reviewed by our Supreme Court. 
Is that correct? 
MR. HOUSLEY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And then to consider the question of 
whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States may 
in fact be willing to rule on the question. 
Has search been denied in cases involving this 
22 issue in the past? 
23 MR. BROWN: Not to my knowledge. 
2• MR. HOUSLEY: Sure. It was denied in the Santos case, 
25 Your Honor. 
26 · ht y The Santos case i·sn't THE COURT: All rig • es. 
27 as helpful, however. 
28 
29 
30 
MR. HOUSLEY: That case stands for the proposition, 
· · "'ased on the same rationale basically, of, although it is ~ 
h t of that case, and I don't as the Latta case, the t rus 
253 
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wher·e they used evidence that was not admissible at trial 
2 for the parole revocation hearing. 
3 THE COURT: The court upheld the use of the evidence, 
4 I understood. 
5 MR. BROWN: The court upheld the use of that at an 
6 administrative hearing. 
7 MR. HOUSLEY: That was on the issue of consent. So 
8 it didn't really get into the question of the parolees. 
9 THE COURT: It didn't deal with. the search and 
10 seizure question at all, it sounds like. 
11 MR. BROWN: But I would discourage the court, in 
12 ruling on this question, to base it on which party has the 
13 best vehicle for appeal. 
14 THE COURT: Well, that clearly would not be the 
15 basis for my ruling. I simply indicated to you my concern.-
16 in that area partly because it seems to me that there are 
17 two equally strong and equally leaning lines of authority 
18 on this question, neither of which has been considered and 
19 ruled upon either by ¢ur Supreme Court or by the Supreme 
20 Court of the United States. So I have absolutely no guidance• 
-21 whatsoever within this jurisdiction, and in that c9ntext I 
22 think it does become significant, to me at least, to assess 
23 the degrees to which my ruling would be reviewed in this 
24 jurisdiction. 
25 MR. BROWN: The court has the material and the argu-
26 ment. I would ask the court to rule on the position that you 
27 feel is the one that favors the parolee having the same 
28 constitutional rights as an ordinary citizen. 
29 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. 
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MR. HOUSLEY: Your Ho I. nor, would only mention 
Mr. Brown's interpretation of Latta. I th' ink if you read 
Latta it does not stand for the proposition that there 
is a diminution of the parolee's constitutional rights. 
It merely says that it has to be reasonable. And in effect, 
it merely says.·that it has to be reasonable, cana that is a 
parolee and his parole officer making a s~arch is one of 
the factors that goes into testing the reasonableness of 
the search. 
10 THE COURT: Yes. I agree. I don't think Latta shlnds 
11 for the constructive code theory at all. They discuss the 
12 constructive code there, and they identify it and isolate 
13 it as having been a ground for the ruling in a number of case 
that they cited in analyzing. 
15 MR. BROWN: They certainly wouldn't have permitted 
16 the search like that of an ordinary citizen. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
21 
25 
26 
2; 
28 
29 
30 
THE COURT: No. I agree. However, the emphasis, 
and I think really it comes out of the part of the Latta 
opinion that discusses the fact that the warrant requirement 
in their view would frustrate the purposes of the search 
and the regulatory scheme of which it was a part, they 
emphasize the regulatory scheme and the involvement of the 
parole officer with tre parolee as a part of the rehabilita-
tion process. 
They say, "We think it indisputable, in view of 
and Of the .parole agent's responsi-the nature of the parolee 
d them, that, were a warrant bilities, as we have anlayze 
necessary would have to be substan-required, the showing 
to avoid frustrating tailly different from probable cause 
the end or the purposes of parole·" --------------' 
Ill 1 
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And then they go on to decide that that would 
in fact make the whole warrant process totally unnecessary. 
Frankly, I think that the sense is a very cogent thing about 
that approach. And in fact I think that the two approaches 
to the problem are very cogently set out in Latta, both in 
the major-ity opinion and in the dissent. 
The majority opinion apparently makes a thresh-
hold determination that in the case 9f parolees you are 
dealing -- and here is where the constructive code theory 
probably comes in in a secondary capacity -- you are dealing 
with a lesser expectation of privacy on the one hand and a 
very high degree of regulation and a specialized relation-
ship between the parole officer and parolee on the other. 
The dissent takes the position that warrantle&s 
searches are , per se, unreasonable, and proceeds with its 
analysis. 
MR. BROWN: That is Coolidge vs. New Hampshire. 
THE COURT: And proceeds with its analysis from there; 
19 whereas, the majority says, "No. Because of the special 
20 status of parolees we can deal with the reasonableness 
21 question from square one, rather than with the presumption 
22 that exists with respect to other kinds of citizens. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
All right. I have had an opportunity to read 
all of the citations which have been submitted to the 
court by counsel and I have read LaFave's detailed analysis 
of the cases and the theories in this area, and I suppose 
it's clear from my comments during the course of your argu-
ments that it is not an easy matter for me to resolve. 
I will make the following findings of fact in 
connection with the motion to suppress: 
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Number one, I find that the defendant was in 
fact a parolee subject to the supervision of the Utah 
Division of Corrections at th t' h e ime t e search was conducted. 
I believe that has been shown by a preponderance of evidence 
in this hearing. 
Number two, I am able to find as a matter of 
fact that the search was reasonable, as it was conducted in 
furtherance of the supervisory duties and' obligations of 
the Division of Adult Probation and Parole at the time: that 
is, to discover whether Mr. Garcia, and also with respect to 
the defendant Velasquez, to discover, one, whether they 
were using drugs or dealing in drugs: and number two, whethe 
they were involved in related criminal activities involving 
either the drugs or possibly the juveniles. 
I think that the facts on which the reasonable 
suspicion of the parole officers was based have been set 
forth in the evidence: namely, the fact that Mr. Garcia and 
Mr. Velasquez were living together with no clear and visible 
means of support, the employment of Mr. Velasquez being a 
problem. 
Number three, the existence of minors on the 
premises in the past: number four, information from an 
informant respecting drug dealing: and number five, the 
fact that a murder had taken place, or a killing, a violent 
killing, had taken place in the apartment next door to the 
location of the defendants and the past rec.ord of each of 
the defendants, each of them having been connected in the 
past with similar crimes, Mr. Garcia as a perpetrator and 
Mr. Velasquez as a witness, and the apparent confusion noted 
by witness Harris of the place in the i11vestigation of that Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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particular offense as to the identity of these defendants. 
Now, the reason I isolate all of those facts is 
I do not think and could not find as a matter of fact that 
all of these factors together would have met a probable 
cause standard, had application been made for a warrant. 
However, as a matter of law I am finding that a reasonable-
ness standard may be applied in the special circumstances 
of parolees. 
That leads us to the unde~lying question of 
whether the warrant requirement can be dispensed with in 
the State of Utah. And there being no law whatsoever on 
this question, under the circumstances of this case I am 
willing to take the progressive trend that's been argued for 
by Mr. Brown on behalf of the defendant, if in fact it is a 
progressive trend. That is how it is characterized by 
LaFave. I feel that it is unlikely that that would be 
adopted in the State of Utah, and I am concerned under the 
18 facts of this case about its application at the trial level. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Therefore, I am going to hold as a matter of 
law that the reasoning adopted by the Ninth-:Circuit in the 
LaFave case is sufficient to substantiate my ruling here. 
That's based, I think, in part, and of course anyone can 
read the opinion and decide what it is based on, but I think 
it is based in part on a finding that reasonable expectations 
of privacy belonging to a parolee are different in some 
fashion from those of other citizens. 
27 Number·two, the relationship between parole 
28 supervision and parolees is such that there is a necessity 
29 for unannounced searches based upon reasonable suspicion 
30 of criminal activity or parole violation, which I have found I 
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as a matter of fact exist here. 
I am going to take the position that the appli-
cation of the reasonabl d eness stan ard is sufficient, even 
though applied retroactively, and I do understand clearly 
the theoretical problems with that. B t u I am going to take 
6 that position. 
i 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
l~ 
15 
16 
MR. BROWN: Would the court state t,hat again, please? -
THE COURT: That the reasonableness standard applied 
retroactively to determine whether the searches of parolees 
were valid is adequate to protect the constitutional rights 
of parolees in the fourth amendment area. 
For example, the LaFave case points out that in 
any given case what is done in the way of a search may be 
so unreasonable as to require that it be struck down under 
the fourth amendment, and they did not accept the notion that 
a parole officer may conduct full blown searches of parolees' 
17 homes whenever and as often as they feel like it. I agree 
18 with that characterization, and I don't think the LaFave 
19 rationale stands for the proposition that parole officers 
20 have complete discretion. 
21 I think that wherever possible their discretion 
22 ought to be exercised in the direction of obtaini~g a 
2.'l warrant for searches, but in this case I am not going to 
2~ hold that the search is unreasonable either, because it 
25 was without a warrant or on the basis of the fact that gave 
26 rise to it, which means that the motion to suppress is 
27 
28 
29 
30 
denied. On to the question of a mistrial We don't have to go 
motion because of the reference made in opening statements. 
Of 12:00 and the jury has It is now a quarter 
been waiting for 45 minutes. t t
hat we begin with I sugges 
fl I 
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